The Causes of non-state terrorism 

 

While terrorism has plagued world politics for centuries, with some historians placing the beginnings of terrorism in the first century BCE with the Sicarii Zealots (who violently targeted Jewish high priests, whom they saw as collaborating with the Romans in violation of Jewish religious law), terrorism today is arguably much different than in the past. Terrorism now is seen as:

 

• global, in the sense that with the death of distance, borders no longer serve as barriers to terrorism

• lethal, because now terrorists have shifted their tactics from theatrical violent acts seeking to alarm for publicity to purposeful destruction of a target's civilian  non-combatants, to kill as many as possible for the purpose of instilling fear in as many people as possible

• reliant on the most advanced technology of modern civilization, despite viewing sophisticated technological means of modern civilization as a threat to the terrorists' sacred traditions

• orchestrated by transnational non-state organizations through global conspiratorial networks of terrorist cells located in many countries, involving unprecedented levels of communication and coordination

 

 

One of the defining features of terrorism in our world today is the enhanced role played by global contact in shaping the different routes that individuals have taken to terrorism. This aspect of the contemporary terrorism phenomenon should alert us to the extent to which the emergence of terrorist groups that are international in their aims and contacts, such as al-Qaida, is part of the same general trend that is also leading to other problematic developments in terms of peace and security. Under the conditions of globalisation there has emerged a wide array of issues that elude resolution by states acting alone. Among the most obvious is the rapid deterioration in the sustainability of the earth's ecosystems, but into the mix we also need to include the re-emergence of militarily significant private armies, crime syndicates with sufficient financial and firepower to intimidate, and perhaps even control, the governments of small nations, and of course terrorist organisations.

 

Globalisation has eroded the protective power of national borders and diminished the capacity of conventional military doctrines and equipment to provide the basis upon which national security rests. There is very little that the best equipped and most technologically advanced army in the world can do to protect the welfare of a nation suffering the effects of drought or floods brought on by climate change that in turn is caused by the actions of the entire global community (although clearly some members cause more damage than others). Similarly, there is little that conventional military forces can do to combat the threat to national security posed by individuals whose anger is invisible but intense, who travel with legitimate visas and passports, who carry legally mandated identity cards, and who have learnt from the internet how to make a bomb from products found in almost every kitchen in the West. In this way, globalisation is feeding a curious development which might be called the 'privatisation of violence'; the situation whereby states are losing their monopoly over the means to wage war. Although it is true that states are likely to remain the sole proprietors of cutting-edge military technology costing billions of dollars, globalisation is feeding the development of new forms of warfare which are allowing enemies of the state, such as terrorists, to 'level the playing field' through the use of simple, cheap but highly deadly technologies and tactics.

 

Most particularly, globalisation has helped to generate and to feed a new set of terrorist motivations. As mentioned above, terrorism has always been a feature of human societies, but it is only recently that it has broken free of local issues and environments and assumed a genuinely global presence, most particularly in the form of al-Qaida, the organisations with which it is affiliated, and the individuals who, although not formal members of any group, are nevertheless motivated by its ideology. Within this context, although bin Laden and other senior al-Qaida figures are most energised by the plight of Muslims in the Middle East, from where they themselves come, they see Western economic and political interference in these countries, along with the simultaneous spread of Western cultural values, as the main reason for the plight of the people they claim to represent.

 

Globalisation has seen a profusion of western popular culture in the Middle East and this is perceived by some to have undermined religious values. Products such as Hollywood movies, Western television and music, and the symbols of Western corporate strength such as MacDonalds bring with them important values such as democracy, individual liberty, and secularism. These values are seen by some as a direct challenge to the desire of those who wish to see religion play a more direct role in society and government. It is worth remembering that Sayed Qutb’s radical beliefs were based on the assumption that Western culture has a negative impact on religion and, al-Qaeda’s desire for the creation of Islamic states based on Shar-ia Law can be seen as militant backlash against cultural globalisation.

 

Summary:

 

Globalisation as an enabler of global terrorism:

 

• The internet provides terrorist groups with the ability to coordinate their actions and gain expertise in, for example, bomb-making techniques.

• The global media allows terrorist groups to spread their ideology  to a global audience

• The increased mobility of people has undermined the protective value of state borders, enabling terrorists to attack even the strongest of states.

 

 

Globalisation as a root cause of terrorism:

 

• The increased mobility of technology and communications has created a culture clash in some regions. Values such as democracy, individual liberty and secularism are at odd with those who believe religion should play a significant role in the state.

   

   

  Terrorism and Perceptions of Injustice

 

A feature of al-Qaida’s declarations of jihad against the West and a constant theme expressed in public statements is a strong sense of injustice within the international system. As we have already seen, despite attempts to establish an international society based on justice and the rule of law, the international system continues to be anarchical in nature. Under these conditions, stronger states are able to exert influence over smaller states and the rule of law, while applied to weaker states, is rarely applied to states who wield significant power in the international system. This has led to perceptions of injustice arising from significant double standards in the application of international law.

 

As the former chief of the CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit Michael Scheuer wrote about bin Laden and his supporters, “The focused and lethal threat posed to U.S. national security arises not from Muslims being offended by what America is, but rather from their plausible perception that the things they most love and value—God, Islam, their brethren, and Muslim lands—are being attacked by America.”  Or, to put it more simply, “They hate us for what we do, not who we are.”

 

Perceptions of injustice for many in the Middle East centre on the actions of Israel and their key ally, the United States. Since 1967, Israel has imposed a military occupation of a region known as the West Bank, populated by Muslims. Israel remains in violation of a United Nations Security Resolution 242 calling for their withdrawal from the West Bank and their occupation of the West Bank violates articles of the Geneva Convention. In particular, the construction of Israeli settlements within the occupied territory is in direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, legitimate means to bring about change have been lacking. Due to their close strategic relationship with Israel, the US has used its veto on 10 occasions since 2000 to protect Israel from UNSC condemnation, the most recent occasion being 2011 when the US vetoed a UNSCR calling for a halt to the illegal construction of settlements in the West Bank.

 

Another important sense of injustice stems from US support for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The US maintains close diplomatic and security ties with government such as Saudi Arabia and maintain an extensive network of military bases in the region in order to secure access to vital Middle Eastern oil reserves. For those who are oppressed or dissatisfied with these regimes, anger is directed towards the US for their support of these governments and for what is perceived as the continued military occupation of their country. According to this perception, illegitimate Missle Eastern regimes are puppets of the United States.

 

Robert Pape, author of Dying to Win, explains the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Pape has collected a database of every suicide terrorist attack between 1980 and 2004, all 462 of them. His conclusions are enlightening and crucial to our understanding the true motivation behind the attacks against Western nations by Islamic terrorists. After his exhaustive study, Pape comes to some very important conclusions.

 

Religious beliefs are less important than supposed. For instance, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist secular group, are the world’s leader in suicide terrorism. The largest Islamic fundamentalist countries have not been responsible for any suicide terrorist attack. None have come from Iran or the Sudan. Until the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iraq never had a suicide terrorist attack in all of its history. Between 1995 and 2004, the al Qaeda years, two-thirds of all attacks came from countries where the U.S. had troops stationed. Iraq’s suicide missions today are carried out by Iraqi Sunnis and Saudis. Recall, 15 of the 19 participants in the 9/11 attacks were Saudis.

 

The strongest motivation, according to Pape, is not religion but rather a desire “to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory the terrorists view as their homeland.”

 

Terrorism and Failed States

 

State failure describes a political situation where government ceases to function effectively, or is hijacked by a small group of people for themselves, and where law and order breaks down in favour of control by those who are armed. Those with guns get what they want, while the rest cower in fear. Under such circumstances people have no state authorities to protect them and must depend upon themselves for security.

 

In these circumstances, where government services are non-existent and where the economy has ceased to function, poverty and despair are common features. Academic and conflict specialist Michael Renner uses the example of Afghanistan to make the point that socio-economic factors lead to extremism that can lead to international terrorism. He points to social humiliation, and lack of job and education opportunities as important factors important factors in the radicalisation of populations.

 

In a more direct sense, the collapse of state authority allows terrorist organisations safe haven within the borders of a failed state. They are able to train, recruit and plan terrorist attacks without inference from state authorities such as the police and the military. It has been established that al-Qaeda utilized Afghanistan as a base for the September 11 attacks. However, regions of Pakistan continue to act as a base for Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists. The mountainous region of Waziristan,  bordering Afghanistan, has become a significant breeding ground for terrorism and a base of operations for Taliban extremists launching attacks on Western forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan, despite efforts to reassert control over the territory, has been unable to do so, once again demonstrating the importance of a lack of state authority in facilitating terrorism.

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Responses to Non-state Terrorism: IGGs and NGOs

 

The United Nations

 

In evaluating the response of the United Nations to the issue of non-state terrorism, your starting point will always be that the UN was not established with non-state movements in mind. In terms of their primary functions regarding global peace and security, the institution was established to respond to the actions of state actors, in particular the prevention of conflict between states. Nevertheless, globalisation and the severity of the September 11 attacks have compelled the institution to adapt to meet the challenge posed to global peace and security by non-state terrorism.

 

One of the primary responses of the UN to non-state terrorism has been the establishment of mechanisms designed to cut off funding to non-state terrorist groups. To this end, a UNSC Resolution passed in 1999 led to the formation of the 1267 Committee. Under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, this committee has the power to:

 

• freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of designated individuals and entities [assets freeze],

• prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by designated individuals[travel ban], and

• prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, spare parts, and technical advice, assistance, or training related to military activities, to designated individuals and entities [arms embargo].

 

The committee has been successful in ensuring a coordinated, multilateral approach to the issue of terrorist funding which has ensured the cooperation of all member states to varying degrees.

 

Following the September 11 attacks a new committee was set up, called the Counter Terrorism Committee, under resolution 1373, and later also 1624. This committee was assisted by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Directorate in providing counter terrorism expertise to states. The committee focuses of providing assistance to member states in combatting non-state terrorism in four ways:

 

• Advice on regulating the finance sector in ways that deny funding to terrorist organisations

• Providing reports on situations within member states with regards terrorist activity and efforts on the part of the state to combat these groups.

• Establishment and promotion of best practice in terms of combating non-state terrorist movements.

• Providing a forum that allows negotiation, discussion and the formulation of coordinated actions designed to counter terrorist activities.

 

A final way in which the United Nations Security Council responded to non-state terrorist threats was to either organise military action against them, or more commonly, to allow other bodies to do so. When Al-Shabbab launched raids into Kenya in 2012, Kenya was given a green light to send troops into Somalia to attack Al-Shabbab, eventually leading to the terrorist group’s decline. And when Malian Islamists seized a large swathe of territory in 2013, France was similarly given a free rein to send forces against them. The justification here was that the Islamists were a threat to the security of Western nations, as they were likely to use the territory to plan terrorist attacks.

 

One criticism sometimes levelled at UN efforts to respond to non-state terrorism is a refusal to negotiate with non-state terrorist groups. Both state actors and the UN have been reluctant to enter into negotiations with such groups fearing that this form of dialogue would provide legitimacy to these groups and act as an incentive for groups to resort to terrorism. This argument suggests that groups would resort to terrorism as a means of forcing negotiations in order to achieve their ends. However, the refusal to negotiate does undermine any prospect for a peaceful resolution to the issue.

 

Non-Governmental Organisations

 

NGO’s are ineffective in terms of preventing non-state terrorism but they do play a significant role in reducing the impact of such attacks and pressuring terrorist movements to conform to international law. NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières play an important role in providing basic services within failed states, which can tackle some of the root causes of terrorism. They also can play an important role in assisting the victims of non-state terrorist groups.

 

The International Red Cross also plays a role in pressuring non-state terrorist movements to conform to international law relating to armed conflict such as the Geneva Conventions. These include not harming civilians and treating prisoners according to international conventions, as well as other international conventions regarding not using landmines and not using child soldiers. The only sanction the non-governmental organisation has in these attempts is to publicise the actions of the non-state armed group if they do not agree. Sometimes such threats of publicity are effective. The world media will often pounce on such stories, and if public feeling globally is strong enough, the terror group may find itself facing calls for military intervention from concerned states.

 

 

States

State-Building

 

The United States has achieved some measure of success in state building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, though considerable instability persists in both states.

 

Initial US efforts at state building to combat the threat of terrorism posed by failed states such as post-Saddam Iraq were under resourced to the extent that the US was arguably in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to the obligations of an occupying power. Section 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention outlines the rights of an occupied populace and the obligations owed them by the occupying power. Of particular importance are provisions relating to the obligations of the occupying power to maintain an acceptable level of security in occupied territories and provide for the basic political, civil, economic and social rights of the occupied civilian population. Following the fall of Saddam in 2003, US forces were too few in number with only 10,000 troops available to provide security in Baghdad, a city of 5 million that had suffered a virtual collapse of services due to the fighting and decades of UN sanctions, was to have significant consequences. Large scale looting in the weeks following the fall of Saddam and the inability of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), charged with administering US-led state-building efforts, ensured that Iraq exhibited most of the characteristics of a failed state during the early years of the occupation.

 

As the Army's official history of the occupation notes dryly: "conditions in Iraq proved to be wildly out of sync with prewar assumptions." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Co. assumed that standing up a new Iraqi government would be quick work and that the light U.S. force would head home almost immediately. But when conditions deteriorated, U.S. leaders -- both civilian and military -- were extremely slow to realize that they faced a wholly different situation. And, as journalist and author Thomas Ricks has documented, once the U.S. military found itself facing a genuine insurgency, it took years before it began to adjust its tactics and strategy in a serious way. We tend to think of the U.S. military as a highly intelligent fighting force -- after all, we've got all those intelligence services, think tanks, in-house analysis operations, war colleges, etc. -- yet this case reminds us that the defense establishment is also big and unwieldy organization that doesn't improvise quickly.

 

In the absence of security, a sectarian conflict between the minority Sunni and majority Shi’a population spiralled out of control and a strong al-Qaeda-led insurgency directed attacks against coalition forces and international aid agencies, further complicating efforts by the US, IGO’s and NGO’s to restore basic services to the civilian population. The continued failure of state-building efforts and the inability of coalition forces to ensure security also ensured that support for coalition forces for having removed a tyrannical dictator rapidly evaporated to the extent that both sides in the sectarian conflict had, by 2005, began directing their efforts towards attacking coalition forces.

 

Post-2007, the states have been able to adapt their responses to asymmetrical tactics which has in turn seen modest improvement in state-building efforts aimed at preventing the emergence of breeding grounds for terrorism in the form of failed states. Advances in surveillance technologies and an emphasis on counter-insurgency forces has allowed states to successfully gather the intelligence required to detect and prevent terrorist attacks which has led to a steady decline in insurgent attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2007. State-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused on the training of national security forces, the training and strengthening of bureaucratic and legal institutions and the provision of reconstruction aid designed to restore basic social and economic rights. Coalition forces were able to withdraw from Iraq in 2010, having overseen highly successful democratic elections in Iraq in 2005 and 2010. In Afghanistan, the international community has struggled to maintain security in the northern part of the country; however, there has been a moderate improvement in the standard of living as a result of state-building efforts:  

 

• Relatively stable democratic institutions have been established,

• Afghan security forces are increasingly taking a leading role in combatting the Taliban insurgency,

• the development of economic institutions have contributed to an average growth rate of 10% over the past decade

• In 2010, the United States began establishing a number of Lincoln learning centers in Afghanistan. They are set up to serve as programming platforms offering English language classes, library facilities, programming venues, Internet connectivity, educational and other counseling services. A goal of the program is to reach at least 4,000 Afghan citizens per month per location.

• States, IGGs and non-state actors have built hospitals and clinics across the country. In 2011, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) significantly expanded its humanitarian activities Afghanistan, providing medical specialists and funding the construction of two hospitals.

• The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a political mission established by the Security Council in 2002 is mandated to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to improve critical areas, including security, governance and economic development. It has a yearly budget of over US$250 million and has led to the creation of relatively stable democratic institutions.

 

Conventional Military Power as a Response to Terrorism

 

The success of terrorist attacks and the use of conventional military force during the initial years of the occupation of Iraq succeeded in transforming al-Qaeda from a group into a movement with global appeal.

 

Spectacular terrorist attacks that drew global attention to al-Qaeda’s ideas succeeding in emphasising their message that the US, though at that time the world’s only remaining superpower, was vulnerable in the same manner that the Soviet Union in Afghanistan had been. Globalisation played an important role, with the increased mobility of technology and communication serving to magnify the impact of the attacks by ensuring that they were broadcast to all corners on the globe.

 

In a more direct sense, al-Qaeda made skilful use of the internet and social media tools to both share expertise but more importantly to increase the appeal of their ideals. Al-Qaeda was able to release statements and videos that aimed to exploit negative perceptions of the United States in Muslim states as a result of US human rights abuses in the years immediately following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The abuse of prisoners by US forces in Abu Ghraib in 2004 and the death of civilians in Muslim states as a result of the use of military force created some sympathy amongst a small section of the Muslim nation for al-Qaeda’s cause. Moreover, videos of successful terrorist attacks in the years following the S-11 attacks served to further emphasise the vulnerability of Western forces.

 

 

Ultimately, the ability of al-Qaeda to exploit soft power in the years immediately following the S11 attacks succeeded in transforming al-Qaeda from a small group of operatives into a global movement This has led to terrorist attacks on Western targets and the emergence of insurgent groups within states that act independently of al-Qaeda, but whose actions are carried out in the name of al-Qaeda and are designed to achieve al-Qaeda’s objectives. This was exemplified by suicide attacks carried out in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively. In both attack, subsequent inquires have concluded that the attackers has never been in direct contact with an al-Qaeda member and were instead radicalised by their exposure to al-Qaeda material on the internet and media reports of violence associated with the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq.

 

As a 2008 RAND report on terrorism concluded, “If the enemy is a terrorist ideology spread throughout the Muslim diaspora, a “shock and awe” strategy is very likely to backfire by reinforcing the enemy’s description of the United States as an aggressive force without regard for the lives of innocent Muslims.’ It  concluded that the use of convention military force during the years of the War on Terror was counterproductive, and a response that favours the view that the struggle against terrorism is an information war requiring an emphasis on policing and intelligence gathering as opposed to military force. The decision by the Obama Administration to initiate peace talks with the Taliban is evidence that state actors are adapting to the threat by exploring non-military approaches to conflict resolution. 

 

Al-Qaeda and the Arab Spring

 

Al-Qaeda’s use of terrorism against civilian targets in the Middle East has seen a rapid decline in sympathy for the movement amongst Muslims and the Arab Spring can be viewed as a rejection of al-Qaeda’s worldview.

Dr. Ihsan al-Shimmary, a political science professor at Baghdad University, has stated that, "The rise of liberal youth currents [of thought] and even moderate Islamist currents in Arab Spring countries caused bin Laden great concern and represented another threat to his organisation. These young people were able to topple dictatorships in their countries through peaceful means, which was a huge blow to al-Qaeda that espouses violence as a means to enable change," al-Shimmary said.

 

Al-Qaeda’s practice of targeting Muslim civilians as part of its effort to topple what it sees as corrupt, apostate regimes in the Middle East have significantly undermined the attractiveness of al-Qaeda’s ideals. High-profile bombing attacks in Middle Eastern countries that have led to mass civilian casualties have seen a rejection of central aspects of al-Qaeda’s philosophy. As evidenced by documents discovered in bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan, this has led to serious funding and recruitment shortfalls. A good example is a the 2005 Amman bombings in which al-Qaeda agents detonated three bombs simultaneously, killing 60 people with the majority of fatalities Muslims who were attending a wedding ceremony. The attacks sparked outrage in Jordan, and saw a rapid decline in sympathy in Jordan for al-Qaeda.

 

Al Qaeda knows that the critical battle is for the younger generation that makes up the mass of the Arab and Muslim populations and fills the ranks of the unemployed. Hundreds of millions are justifiably angered by the oppressive and corrupt leaders of the region and despairing over their bleak economic future. And al Qaeda has worked hard to target the younger audience with a message of empowerment based on violent jihad. Nevertheless, while the call to extremism and a war on the West felled buildings in far-off lands, it failed to topple a single regime back home.

 

In this sense, the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya can be seen as a rejection of al-Qaeda’s means and ends. In Tunisia and Egypt, corrupt regimes were overthrown using largely peaceful methods, rather than the use of terrorist tactics. Furthermore, the government that have emerged following uprisings represent a rejection of al-Qaeda’s preference for non-secular governments based on Sharia Law. Since coming to power in elections in 2012, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a group with ideas very similar to those of al-Qaeda, have refused to impose a conservative version of Sharia law whilst Tunisia’s post-revolution looks set to maintain a secular approach to government and society

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The effectivness of asymmetrical conflict

 

Al-Qaeda’s use of asymmetrical warfare against coalition peacekeeping forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has been somewhat successful in undermining public support for continued Western intervention in these states.

 

Asymmetrical warfare, which involves the tactics employed by a weaker opponent and designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of a stronger foe, has been successful in undermining security. The purpose of such tactics is to seek to avoid open engagements in which the stronger power can exploit their often superior mobility and firepower. Instead, insurgent groups rely on hit and run tactics, intended to inflict a steady stream of casualties on the opponent before withdrawing. The use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which take the form of roadside bombs and mines that can inflict casualties, though are more intended to combat the superior mobility of a stronger opponent, slowing down the movement of troops and vehicles. As of September, US forces having suffered over 4800 fatalities in Iraq and coalition forces sustaining over 3100 casualties in Afghanistan. These fatalities far exceed the initial invasions of these states, demonstrating the effectiveness of employing asymmetrical tactics against a superior opponent.

 

Asymmetrical tactics have also been successfully employed by terrorist groups to undermine the security of Western democracies, provoking a reaction that has created a substantial financial burden and briefly served to undermined the soft power of the West. The September 11 attacks, carried out by nineteen hijackers armed only with boxcutters available for purchase at any hardware store, was an asymmetrical attack in that it sought to exploit the openness of Western liberal democracies to create as much fear as possible. As Harvard psychologist Daniel Gilbert explains, human being are hard-wired to be particularly sensitive to threats that are intended by others, that trigger moral outrage, that seem clear and present, and that catch them by surprise. Terrorism is like theatre, and al-Qaeda relied on the dramatic impact of their actions to magnify the effects. It might be argued that the reaction of some state actors to this fear was to undermine basic human rights in order to combat the threat posed by transnational terrorism. Some of the provisions of the Patriot Act, and the creation of the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, it might be argued, prevented another terrorist attack on the soil of the US, it has undermined the appeal of Western liberal democracies. As international relations scholar Joseph Nye has argued, asymmetrical warfare succeeded in forcing a reaction from some state actors that ‘struck many around the world as a retreat from the principles of democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law that represented America’s most attractive soft-power asset.’ In this sense, the initial US response to S11 attacks led to an increase in unfavourable view of the US in many Middle Eastern states, undermining the ability of the US to attract states to cooperate in global efforts to combat terrorism. The implications of this diminished soft-power is Pakistan, who at times have been accused of failing to fully cooperate with US efforts to eliminate al-Qaeda. Not only was Osama bin Laden thought to have been hiding for some time in Pakistan before he was killed by US forces in 2011, Pakistan’s efforts to restore some measure of control in tribal regions bordering Afghanistan and used by the Taliban and al-Qaeda for staging attacks, have been half-hearted at times. Globalisation ensures that terrorism is now a global issue requiring a cooperative solution, and the damage to US soft-power has undermined their ability to seek the cooperation of some Muslim states, undermining their ability to effectively respond to the issue of global terrorism.    

 

The ultimate objective of al-Qaeda is the withdrawal of Western forces from Muslim lands, and asymmetrical warfare has been somewhat successful in achieving this goal. The erosion of security in Western states as a result of the terrorist threat, coupled with steady casualties from protracted occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan were ultimately aimed at undermining public support and political will to maintain commitments to far distant conflicts. Particularly in post-industrial societies, tolerance for war and casualties is generally low, meaning that while there may initially be strong support for the conflict, the longer the conflict continues and the greater the casualties sustained, the more likely public opinion will turn against the conflict. When this happens, particularly in democratic societies, there is often enormous pressure placed on the government to end the conflict as soon as possible. The impact of asymmetrical warfare in achieving these ends can be seen in the US occupation of Iraq which had, by 2005, decisively turned against the conflict. The loss of control of Congress by the Republican party following a voter backlash in the 2006 mid-tem elections and the 2008 election of Barack Obama following his promise to begin withdrawing occupation forces from Iraq, demonstrate the significant political impact that asymmetrical warfare employed by non-state actors can have on states.